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SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION:
A METHOD FOR ACHIEVING
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,' black parents sued the
School Board of the City of Richmond, the school boards of two ad-
joining counties and the State Board of Education in a class action to
consolidate the three local school districts into a unitary system.2
Plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection of the laws because the
maintenance of separate districts by the state resulted in racially
identifiable districts in the Richmond area. Since 1955, the percentage
of blacks in Richmond had risen from 43.4 per cent to 70 per cent,
while that of Henrico and Chesterfield counties dropped from 20.4
per cent and 10.4 per cent, respectively, to approximately nine per
cent. The schools within each district reflected this racial distribu-
tion. These changes in housing patterns made less drastic judicial
remedies, such as zoning, pairing and intra-district busing, ineffective
in eliminating the dual school system within the metropolitan area.
Each school district had achieved satisfactory desegregation within
its own jurisdiction but was incapable of doing so for the entire
"community of interest" due to the uneven distribution of blacks
and whites among those districts. Thus, the federal district court in
Bradley found that the existing distribution of school divisions con-
stituted de jure segregation. No other remedy being sufficient, the
court ordered defendants to consolidate the three school districts and
eliminate racially identifiable schools within the single jurisdiction.
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court's finding of de jure segregation and held that
the consolidation order had therefore exceeded the court's "power of
intervention." 3 The court remarked that the causes of de facto segre-
1. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
2. Plaintiffs originally sued only the Richmond School Board. After considera-
ble litigation, defendant compelled the joinder of the adjoining Henrico and
Chesterfield County School Boards and the Virginia State Board of Education.
3. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972). Only the two counties and the State Board
appealed from the district court judgment. The city School Board was named a
respondent.
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gation in Richmond were "simply not known" and that there was no
evidence of interaction between state and local boards. The majority
emphasized that no board could consolidate on its own motion and
that school administration was an exclusively local concern. Consoli-
dation was also impractical since the tax bases and electorates of
each district were different, and undesirable since parental participa-
tion in school affairs would be reduced.4
Finding only de facto segregation, the Bradley court felt bound by
Spencer v. Kugler5 in which blacks sought to consolidate several New
Jersey school districts but failed because the district court found no
evidence of de jure segregation. The Supreme Court summarily
affirmed Spencer's holding that de facto segregation was not actiona-
ble.6
Significantly, however, the circuit court overturned only the district
court's determination of fact in Bradley. The court did not hold that
consolidation was an improper remedy in the presence of de jure
segregation. Since Bradley is being appealed to the Supreme Court,
and similar suits have been filed in other cities, the propriety of con-
solidation as an equitable remedy is still unresolved.
Assuming the existence of de jure segregation, the remedy applied
by the district court is appropriate, considering the broad injunctive
powers that have been used to effectuate desegregation orders. The
historic case of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1)7 first estab-
lished that racial segregation violated the fourteenth amendment, but
did not offer specific judicial remedies. The second case by that name
(Brown 11) 8 expanded Brown I and required school boards to pro-
pose, "with all deliberate speed,"9 desegregation plans which local
courts could reject or enforce with appropriate equitable remedies.
4. The dissent found action and inaction by state and local authorities over a
long period of time to be sufficient evidence of de lure segregation. The dissenting
judge was not influenced by the inconvenience of consolidation because such pro-
cedures were actually contemplated by the Virginia statutes and could still be
utilized with sufficient cooperation. Id. at 1075, 1079.
5. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
The dissenting judge in Bradley thought Spencer was not controlling. He felt
that in Spencer there was no history of state-imposed segregation among the
school districts. Spencer merely rejected an arbitrary racial balance for its own
sake. 462 F.2d at 1079.
6. 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Id. at 301.
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Delays prevented the full implementation of Brown 1, however,
until 1968 when the Supreme Court, in Green v. New Kent County
School Board,'0 invalidated a "freedom of choice" plan submitted by
the defendant school board. This plan purported to implement de-
segregation by allowing pupils to attend any school of their choice,
but the Court rejected it because results would come too slowly. Re-
affirming Brown 11, the Court emphasized that "[t]he burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work ... now . . .until it is clear that state-imposed
segregation has been completely removed."" In accordance with
Green, the Court in Alexander v. Holmes County School Board 2 de-
nied motions for additional time to obey lower court orders because
"the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools."a
Continued dilatory tactics by recalcitrant school boards, however,
eventually called for a much stronger equitable remedy-the forced
busing of students within a school district. The Supreme Court
unanimously upheld this measure in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,14 and granted lower courts a broad mandate for
fashioning equitable remedies, including altering attendance zones to
allow pairing of non-contiguous zones, busing, establishment of fac-
ulty ratios, regulation of school construction and optional majority
to minority transfer plans. In response to objections that these
measures created hardships for school boards, children and their
families, the Court remarked that "[t]he reconciliation of competing
values in a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many
sensitive facets but fundamentally no more so than remedial measures
courts of equity have traditionally employed."'I5 The Court also con-
strued 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6,16 which forbade forced busing to achieve
10. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
11. Id. at 439.
12. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
13. Id. at 20.
14. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
15. Id. at 31. Oddly enough,the Fourth Circuit, in Bradley, relied on language
in Swann to establish the limits of equitable powers which, in its opinion, the dis-
trict court had exceeded. 462 F.2d at 1069.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970) reads in part:
[N]othing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to
issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring
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a "racial balance," to be a limitation intended only to prevent expan-
sion under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of existing injunctive powers
of a federal district court.27
Plaintiffs considered these remedies insufficient, however, because
firmly established housing patterns and years of de jure segregation
had resulted in racially identifiable school districts.' s Accordingly,
plaintiffs in Bradley prayed for consolidation to insure the immediate
operation of a unitary school system throughout the Richmond area
in compliance with Brown 11 and the Green and Alexander cases.
The district court remedy is significant in that it extends the duties
of the state and local boards in eliminating racially identifiable
schools to include the consolidation of local districts through existing
statutory procedures.' 9 Never before had a state been ordered to con-
solidate school districts that coincided with city and county boun-
daries. This could result in reducing the flight of whites from the
city into the suburbs; by relocating, white parents could no longer
escape from integrated schools since busing would extend beyond the
old districts. 20 This remedy has since been applied to northern cities
the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one
school district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise
enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitu-
tional standards. (Emphasis added.)
17. President Nixon has proposed legislation creating a "moratorium on bus-
ing" which would prevent federal courts from ordering the forced transportation
of students. H.R. 13,916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Although the constitu-
tionality of the moratorium is questionable, there are also proposed constitutional
amendments to prohibit busing. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 30, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1972); S.J. Res. 165, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
18. See generally Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitu-
tional Concepts, 78 H~Av. L. REv. 564 (1965), for a discussion of the many fac-
tors contributing to segregated schools.
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-30,-100.1 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
Originally, the State Board could initiate consolidation, but after being joined
with the counties and the city as a defendant, the legislature amended the statutes
to require local consent. Id. § 22-30. Since the amendment made consolidation
more difficult, but not impossible, it is unclear how the General Assembly hoped
to prevent forced consolidation by the federal district court. Since all three local
boards were parties defendant with the State, mutual cooperation was insured.
20. Note, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblock to
the Implementation of Brown, 12 Wa!. & MARY L. Rav. 838, 856 (1971). The
district court found that whites were fleeing to the suburbs while blacks were
forced to stay in Richmond because of private and state segregation policies. The
fourth circuit rejected this theory as unsupported with statistics showing a fairly




as well. In Bradley v. Milliken,*" a federal district court ordered the
consolidation of several Detroit area school districts for similar rea-
sons.
The effect of the district court ruling on multi-jurisdiction urban
areas, however, remains less clear.2 2 Federal courts could order con-
solidation of several districts when all are located in one state; but
urban areas such as Washington, D.C., Kansas City and others overlap
state lines. The forced consolidation of school districts created by
different states might well be unconstitutional.
Significantly, the district court and the dissenting judge of the
Fourth Circuit relied on the established principle that the burden of
desegregation is on the state and not just the local school boards.23
Because school districts are created by the legislature to implement
statewide policies, they are not real municipal entities but are only
"quasi-corporations." 24 As such, they are never truly local despite
coincidence with city and county boundaries. Because a state may not
delegate its authority to local subdivisions in order to insulate itself
from judicial intervention, the Eighth Circuit has held that a previous
consolidation order must be enforced even though it contravened
state law.25
Considerable precedent also exists for the interference by federal
courts with the boundaries of school districts, though most decisions
have not gone beyond the lower courts as yet.26 However, in Brown
II, the Supreme Court stated that lower courts might consider the "re-
vision of school districts" to insure compliance with the fourteenth
21. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1971). This decision was rendered subse-
quent to the district court decision in Richmond, but before its reversal by the
Fourth Circuit was announced.
22. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblock to the
Implementation of Brown, supra note 20, at 857.
23. See, e.g., Smith v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 444 F.2d 6 (4th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 431 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir.
1970); Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss.
1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Ala.), aff'd
sub nor., Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
24. L. GARBER & N. EDMUND, THE LAW RELATING TO THE CREATION AND
DisSOLUTION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 3 (1962). See also Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), and Note, Municipal Corporations-Power of the
Legislature to Alter Municipal Boundaries, 21 LA. L. REv. 676 (1961).
25. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).
26. See notes 28, 29, 31-33 infra.
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amendment.27 Similarly, other circuits have enjoined the division of
larger districts into several smaller units where such a division would
encourage segregation. 28 On two occasions the Fourth Circuit de-
dined to do so,29 but was later reversed by the Supreme Court which
upheld district court findings of segregation.30 In other circuits, fed-
eral courts have also ordered neighboring school districts to pair
27. 349 U.S. at 300-01.
[Courts] may consider problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, per-
sonnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a non-
racial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be neces-
sary in solving the foregoing problems. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
28. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); Stout
v. United States, 448 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1971); Aytch v. Mitchell, 320 F. Supp.
1372 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Burleson v. County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 308 F.
Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970). In Stout and Lee
the original school districts coincided with county lines; the splinter districts
would not have done so.
29. Separation was permitted in United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971), where the number of blacks in the original
district would increase only three per cent, and in Wright v. County School Bd.,
309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), where the number of blacks would in-
crease by six per cent. In both cases, the Fourth Circuit applied the following
test:
If the creation of a new school district is designed to further the aim of pro-
viding quality education and is attended secondarily by a modification of the
racial balance, short of resegregation, the federal courts should not interfere.
If, however, the primary purpose for creating a new school district is to re-
tain as much of separation of the races as possible, the state has violated its
affirmative constitutional duty to end state supported school segregation. The
test is much easier to state than it is to apply.
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, supra at 572. These cases were not, how-
ever, cited by the Fourth Circuit in its reversal of Bradley.
30. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972);
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). The Supreme
Court held that federal courts must be guided not by the state's motivation, but
by the effects of its action. In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court remarked:
We hold only that a new school district may not be created where its effect
would be to impede the process of dismantling a dual system. And in mak-
ing that essentially factual determination in any particular case, "we must of
necessity rely to a large extent, as this court has for more than 16 years, on
the informed judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on courts
of appeals." (Emphasis added.)




facilities,' - act jointly under one board 32 and collaborate on separate
desegregation plans.33
The district court relied heavily on the decision in Haney v. County
Board of Education. 4 The Eighth Circuit in that decision ordered
the merger of adjacent school districts because existing boundaries en-
couraged segregation. Those districts, however, were very irregular
in shape and corresponded only to segregated housing patterns. In
contrast, those in Bradley were coincidental with long established
city and county boundaries. Other cases have supported forced con-
solidation by dicta. A district court in Calhoun v. Cook-5 suggested
the possibility of merger and, upon remand from the Fifth Circuit,
proceeded to enter supplementary conclusions of law upon that issue.
The district court order in Bradley would not adversely affect the
administration of public schools in the Richmond area.36 The con-
solidated district would not be unusual in its geographic area or size
of enrollments in comparison to other Virginia school districts.3r On
previous occasions the State Board had encouraged the crossing of
district lines to maintain segregation. It had previously permitted
consolidation, operation of joint schools and inter-district contracts.
Furthermore, all three districts had used busing for years. The dis-
trict court merely compelled the state to perform those functions for
purposes of desegregation. The boundaries of Richmond and the
two counties also served no valid educational purpose and had been
31. Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Tenn.
1971).
32. Taylor v. Coahoma County School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Miss.
1971).
33. United States v. Crockett County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 1663 (W.D.
Tenn., filed -, 1967).
34. 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1970).
35. 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga.), vacated in part, 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1971). The "comment" by the district court noted that "[in terms of efficiency,
taxes, and quality education, such consolidations normally produce long-range
improvements." 332 F. Supp. at 809. The supplementary conclusions of law
ordered upon remand by the Fifth Circuit have not yet been entered.
36. The district court makes no discussion of possible "political question"
issues. Presumably such an argument would be precluded by Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
37. Before consolidation, the Richmond district was 63 square miles with
47,824 students; the Henrico district, 244 square miles with 34,080 students; and
the Chesterfield district, 445 square miles with 24,069 students. After consolida-
tion, the new district would be 750 square miles with 104,000 students. Another
Virginia district, Fairfax county, encompasses 135,000 students and there are six
others with area in excess of 700 square miles. 462 F.2d at 1062 n.16.
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modified frequently. Even boundaries based on natural or man-made
obstacles are not permissible if the effect of such boundaries is to
foster racially identifiable schools.38 While redistricting may be a
relatively new remedy in school desegregation cases, the Supreme
Court has upheld the judicial reorganization of state political sub-
divisions in other areas of the law. In Reynolds v. Sims 3 0 and Avery
v. Midland County,40 state and local legislative districts were redrawn
to effectuate court orders enforcing the equal protection clause. Simi-
larly, a federal court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot4 prevented a munic-
ipality from gerrymandering voting districts so as to deny blacks
equal voting rights under the fifteenth amendment. The court also
denied that municipal boundaries involved a non-justiciable political
question.
Although relied upon by the district court, these cases are not
directly in point insofar as Reynolds and Avery involved only elec-
toral districts and not governmental units possessing a measure of
local autonomy. The Gomillion case involved only one municipality,
while Bradley affected three independent districts. But these cases do
establish the general principle that if a state contravenes the four-
teenth amendment in exercising control over its political subdivisions,
then the federal courts may compel a reorganization.
The future of Bradley is uncertain. The Fourth Circuit reversed
only the district court's finding of de jure segregation in Richmond
and did not address itself to the propriety of consolidation where
38. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) (highway as boun-
dary); Henry v. Clarksdale Munic. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th
Cir. 1969) (railroad tracks); United States v. Greenwood School Dist., 406 F.2d
1086 (5th Cir. 1969) (river). In Greenwood, the court noted that "[G]eographic
zoning is acceptable only if it tends to disestablish rather than reinforce the dual
school system of segregated schools." Id. at 1093.
39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Concerning reapportionment of state legislative dis-
tricts, the Court remarked:
A state may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political
subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of con-
tiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid con-
siderations may underlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without any
regard for political subdivisions or natural or historical boundary lines, may
be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.
Id. at 578-79. But the Court later qualified this by adding, "[w]hatever the means
of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality of popula-
tion among the various districts...." Id. at 579.
40. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
41. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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state-imposed segregation does exist. In addition, many of the prec-
edents relied upon by the district court in Bradley came from other
circuits. The Fourth Circuit has also been frequently reversed by the
Supreme Court in its review of district court desegregation orders.42
On appeal, the Supreme Court may uphold the district court findings
and, if so, will necessarily have to rule on the consolidation issue. But
even if the Court should uphold the reversal of Bradley, Milliken and
other consolidation cases, the lower courts may eventually force a deci-
sion on the issue of consolidation.
The uncertainty is further complicated by the change in member-
ship of the Supreme Court since Swann and by the growing pressures
for a constitutional amendment to prohibit busing. If such an amend-
ment were adopted it would not affect forced consolidation per se, but
would render the remedy nugatory since such an enormous school
district could not be easily desegregated without busing.43
Edward D. Holmes
42. See note 30 supra.
43. One effect of Bradley is the busing of students over a much larger area
than in previous instances.
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